“The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.” – Hannah Arendt, (Origins of Totalitarianism, 2017, 387-388).
These profound words by Hannah Arendt frame the central concern of the current practices on citizenship with increasing deprivation decisions.
Deprivation of citizenship represents one of the exceptional power’s states can exercise today. Particularly in the United Kingdom, citizenship deprivation decisions are increasingly being utilised as a tool to preserve national security and counter terrorism. With recent changes in the framework, it is reported that ‘two in five people’ in England and Wales from an ethnic minority background could become eligible to be deprived of their citizenship without warning’.
The UK is emerging as a leading jurisdiction in the use of these deprivation powers, reflecting an increasing trend across Europe. This is evidenced by the stark rise in cases, which climbed from single digits in the early 2010s to over 300 in 2022.
Over the years, the perception of nationality is evolving with citizenship being treated as a revocable right. Practices of deprivation are increasingly preferred over criminal justice routes shaping citizenship as an administrative measure. Considering the rights and protections attached to citizenship, one might question whether this new approach turns citizenship into a privilege. Significantly, this raises questions on whether securitisation is a way to evolve separations of powers through expanding the authority of the executive.
The Evolution of UK Nationality Law and the Rise of Executive Discretion
When it comes to acquiring British citizenship, the UK’s approach is shaped by historical ideas of individuals as ‘subjects’, which continue to influence how rights and belonging are structured today. The British Nationality Act (BNA) 1981 requires language and residency qualifications for naturalisation, but it lacks an integration process, where Choudry argues that deprivation powers fills this gap to enforce ‘British values’. This is important, as it provides the foundation of understanding as to why the deprivation practices exist in their current form today.
Although the power to deprivation was allowed through BNA 1981, it was largely dormant with the last case in 1973, initially targeting only naturalised citizens. Since then, their scope has expanded to include British-born dual nationals, with thresholds for deprivation lowered. Under the BNA 1981 section 40(2), the Home Secretary can deprive someone of citizenship if it is ‘conducive to the public good’ while preventing statelessness. There is no statutory definition for what that means, and while it encapsulates criminal behaviour it also includes ‘unacceptable behaviour’.
However, after 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings, citizenship deprivation became a key measure for counterterrorism. Consequently, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 section 4 amended the BNA 1981 to expand deprivation powers to include British-born citizens and dual nationals. Following the decisions in high profile cases such as Abu Hamza v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for the Home Department where deprivation orders were rejected on the basis that they would render the individuals stateless, the government responded with major reforms on nationality law. Consequently, Immigration Act 2014 section 66 amended the BNA 1981 safeguard to permit changes deprivation even where it risked statelessness. More recently, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 section 10 further introduced deprivation decisions to be made without notice due to security reasons.
Overall, these changes illustrate a two-tier citizenship system where the practice predominantly affects dual nationals or individuals with non-British heritage which can undermine citizenship equality. The legislation has shifted towards granting the executive body more power, which raises debates about what citizenship means and how it should be assigned.
This approach was further confirmed in the long-running proceedings of Shamima Begum, a UK-born woman who joined ISIS at 15 and had her British citizenship revoked in 2019 on national security grounds and on the basis that she remained a Bangladeshi citizen. Her appeals confirmed that executive is the key decision-maker over deprivation decisions, with limited judicial oversight. Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department also addresses the issue on statelessness where de facto statelessas the court did not acknowledge the unique challenges faced by de facto statelessnessand only recognised de jure statelessness. Begum exemplifies the use of citizenship deprivation as a tool to expand executive discretion, raising concerns about procedural fairness and impact on fundamental rights.
Statelessness, International Law and the Challenges of Globalisation
Considering the UK’s stance on statelessness in Begum, it is key to look back into the international obligations. The UK is party to the 1954 and 1961 Conventions on the Reduction of Statelessness, which aims to protect stateless individuals and limit deprivation of nationality. However, these are subject to exceptions as the 1961 Convention article 8(3) permits states to retain their right to deprive nationality for actions “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state”. Thus, Arnell asks this question of what ‘retaining’ actually means, and whether it includes the reintroduction of powers that the UK had previously removed but later restored through its law reforms.
UNCHR has raised concerns on the recent changes brought by NBA 2022, particularly on deprivation decisions made without notice, claiming it may breach UK’s international obligations.
Begum indicates the significant gaps existing in international law towards the protection of de facto statelessness, highlighting Arendt’s notion of right’s fragility when tied to state recognition.
These decisions might suggest that deprivation is functioning as a punitive measure, rather than a protective one. While it is undeniable that individuals involved in terrorist groups pose a risk, Brady argues that the broad interpretation of ‘unacceptable behaviour’ or ‘risk’ can lead to disproportionate outcomes, treating all individuals as equally culpable, and overlooking whether alternative measures, such as victim reparations, could achieve better outcomes. This can even undermine international state cooperation where states begin to treat the rest of the world as an open ground to expel their unwanted citizens.
This approach can also marginalise and create suspicions within the communities towards ethnic minorities, particularly dual citizens. Such dynamics can inadvertently contribute to the very conditions that enable radicalisation, undermining the policy’s stated objectives.
As nationalist policies rise, globalisation and post-nationalism complicate what citizenship entails. With individuals turning to supranational bodies and international law for rights protection, conventional citizenship frameworks are under strain, expanding beyond domestic rights. Consequently, states view this shift as a threat to their sovereignty, and citizenship in turn becomes a tool for states to resisting the pressures of globalisaiton by control over who belongs.
Evidently, citizenship is more than an administrative position. It reflects identity, belonging and access to the “right to have rights”, famously argued by Arendt. Therefore, we must move away from the current perception of citizenship and tie it to fundamental rights, treating it as a universal right rather than a privilege. It is significant to consider whether integration would solve the underlying issues that lead to deprivation and whether attaching rights to citizenship would be an effective solution to maintain the common objective of national peace and order.
Embedding procedural safeguards and international human right obligations aligning domestic would prevent exclusionary practices, ensuring citizenship functions as a true legal and moral right rather than a conditional instrument of state power. If citizenship becomes conditional and a tool of state power, what does that mean for the future of rights in a globalised world?
This blog outlines the key themes explored in greater depth in the recent article published in the Coventry Law Journal, where it examines the ethical, constitutional and human rights implications of the UK’s contemporary deprivation policies.
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